Speaker
Description
Honeypots designed for databases typically face a trade-off between being safe to run and being credible enough to engage real attackers, and few attempt to interpret what an attacker is doing in real time. Penumbra is a high-interaction adaptive PostgreSQL honeypot that addresses these limitations. It intercepts the PostgreSQL wire protocol, classifies every query in real time using a hierarchical Bernoulli Hidden Markov Model, and reacts by injecting SQL side-effects matched to the attacker’s inferred intent. The architecture is built as separated services connected over gRPC, with the actual database running inside hardened, ephemeral containers. The proof of concept reproduces a full exploit chain end-to-end, recording every step in a structured logging pipeline and capturing forensic artefacts when the session ends. Per-query latency overhead stays below 2 ms on average, keeping the honeypot indistinguishable from a direct database connection. The contribution shows that deep interaction, per-query adaptation and structured logging can be achieved together in one coherent and extensible system.