Speaker
Description
Security Operations Centers (SOCs) must triage large volumes of heterogeneous alerts while preserving decision quality, evidence traceability, and operational safety. This paper presents a controlled multi-agent architecture that combines large language models (LLMs), retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), evidence verification, and human approval for alert triage. The architecture separates alert normalization, contextual enrichment, retrieval, hypothesis formation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, evidence verification, policy enforcement, and reporting, and deliberately augments the analyst rather than delegating autonomous containment or remediation. Retrieved documents and alert fields are treated as data rather than instructions, and claims must cite verifiable sources from a versioned, allowlisted corpus, mitigating prompt injection and RAG poisoning risks. We define four research questions concerning the effect of RAG, multi-agent verification, security controls, and operational cost, and specify a reproducible offline benchmark of 160 synthetic alert cases covering ten ATT&CK techniques, including dedicated prompt-injection and poisoned-RAG variants. The evaluation harness, benchmark integrity, and unit tests are validated end to end, and an executed severity-rule baseline yields chance-level performance (F1 = 0.50) on the paired test split, confirming that contextual evidence, not alert severity alone, is required for correct triage. The pre-specified protocol enables controlled comparison of single-LLM, RAG-augmented, and multi-agent verified configurations under identical conditions, with decision quality, evidence grounding, adversarial robustness, and latency or token cost reported together. The architecture and benchmark support transparent, reproducible evaluation of LLM-assisted triage in operational security contexts.