Speaker
Description
The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol remains the dominant in-vehicle communication backbone, yet its design---conceived in the 1980s without encryption, authentication, or source identification---exposes modern Software-Defined Vehicles to critical cyberattacks. Physical testing is costly, hazardous, and non-reproducible, while purely virtual testbeds lack real-time physical feedback. This paper presents CARLA-CAN, an open-source, hybrid Software-in-the-Loop (SiL) platform that bridges the CARLA 3D driving simulator with Linux SocketCAN virtual buses through a high-performance, multi-threaded C++ routing core. The platform enables closed-loop evaluation: CAN frames injected by an attacker propagate through the virtual bus, are decoded by the routing core, and instantaneously alter the 3D vehicle's physical dynamics---steering, braking, engine state---providing both network-level traces and visual confirmation of attack impact. We implement and validate a comprehensive suite of seven attack scenarios, including DoS flooding, stealth flooding, speed spoofing (chaotic and proportional), engine compromise, body system fuzzing, and a novel state-aware engine attack. Experimental benchmarks demonstrate median passthrough latencies of 355 us across 91,000 CAN frames and sub-1% packet loss at normal automotive frequencies (10--100 ms), confirming real-time fidelity. A systematic comparison with the VitroBench hardware testbed validates the platform's suitability for IDS training dataset generation, educational demonstrations, and rapid prototyping of automotive cybersecurity defenses