Speaker
Description
PCIe hosts identify a peripheral by its configuration-space
declarations, and the IOMMU authorizes its memory access unchecked.
Off-the-shelf FPGAs can impersonate trusted peripherals; how far
host-side telemetry pushes back is unmeasured. We build a ladder of
progressively more capable imitations of one commodity network
controller, scored by a behavioral detector over configuration
semantics, MMIO timing, interrupt dynamics, and receive cadence, with
a masked configuration hash and a platform-state control. The masked
hash flags every rung while leaving genuine runs and cold-boot reads
unflagged; no rung closes the configuration image, so the dynamic
layer measures a structural residual. The strongest rung matches the
genuine mean rates yet leaves a timing texture; the one band-matched loaded capture reads a
straddle (0.63 and 0.68 on two passes). Masking the host-rewritten
bytes moves the structural arm's false alarms to zero across the
development-set cold-boot and relocation captures while every
impostor stays flagged. In the
matched-reference contexts the structural arm alone catches every
impostor run at zero false alarms; the dynamic families need a
condition-matched reference or a fresh profile, and under a fresh
profile their per-family OR flags every relocated impostor at 4--5 of
20 genuine alarms without a catch the structural term does not
already make. The dynamic layer's measured deployment
value is therefore non-positive, and its case rests on the
hypothetical regime where the structural residual is closed, which
this ladder never builds. Our profiles come from one unit per model,
bounding the triage layer to deployments that profile devices at
provisioning; the result prices this detection ceiling without
reaching it and argues quantitatively for hardware-rooted measurement
(CMA, SPDM, IDE, TDISP).
PCIe security, device attestation, IOMMU, behavioral fingerprinting,
FPGA emulation, hardware authenticity