Speaker
Description
We investigate a reusable encrypted-record archi-
tecture, using electronic health records as the implementation
and evaluation case study. Electronic health record (EHR)
platforms must protect sensitive fields across databases, logs,
caches, and backup-oriented infrastructure without making or-
dinary clinical transactions impractical. This paper presents
and evaluates CryptoShred Health, a containerized EHR pro-
totype that combines record-level AES-256-GCM encryption,
per-entity envelope keys managed by a three-node HashiCorp
Vault cluster, context binding through authenticated associated
data, deterministic HMAC-SHA256 blind indexes for exact-match
lookup, PostgreSQL ciphertext persistence, Redis read caching,
and Kafka audit events. We separate isolated cryptographic costs
from end-to-end behavior. On a Java 21 testbed, local AES-GCM
processing averaged 22.18 μs per operation, whereas a full Vault-
backed envelope operation averaged 10.68 ms. Short-duration
k6 workload experiments across 1–500 virtual users produced
96,820.5 requests/s for reads under an 85% Redis hit model at
500 users (p50 4.92 ms, p99 12.40 ms), and 14,890.2 requests/s
for encrypted ingestion (p50 31.80 ms, p99 84.10 ms). The
results show that application-layer encryption and centralized
key wrapping can coexist with low-latency reads when cache
and key-management boundaries are explicit. We also identify
the security leakage of deterministic indexes and plaintext caches,
and delimit the conclusions imposed by synthetic data, brief
measurement windows, and a prototype deployment.