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Description
Abstract: Millions of vehicles use aftermarket Android head units exposing USB, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, ADB, and CAN interfaces, weakly hardened and sitting one hop away from safety-sensitive buses. In this paper we report on a controlled bench penetration test of a popular aftermarket infotainment unit (Rockchip RK3399, Android 10) installed in a Ford Focus Mk2, using only commodity hardware: a Raspberry Pi implant, a software-defined Wi-Fi adapter, and a SocketCAN interface. Following a PTES-derived method aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 and scored with DREAD, we demonstrate a full attack chain that uses no zero-day: associating with the unit's Wi-Fi hotspot over the stock default password, gaining unauthenticated ADB root on a user debug build, and extracting plaintext credentials, including the previous owner's saved Wi-Fi passphrases and 59 cached Google OAuth tokens with mailbox, contacts, and location scopes. All findings follow responsible disclosure. We contribute a repeatable, low-cost method, a sixteen-finding risk register, and a human-supervised, locally hosted LLM-assisted testing framework, reported with both contributions and failure modes