Speaker
Description
Digital-sovereignty policy usually emphasises data location, whereas public-service availability also depends on the organisations operating authoritative DNS, edge or content-delivery networks, and hosting; configured mail and certificate issuance expose related dependencies. We map these five layers for a purposive sample of 192 Romanian public-facing services in ten sector groups derived from the NIS2 annexes. A Bucharest measurement, compared with a non-Romanian cloud vantage, used low-rate DNS queries, one certificate read, and one landing-page request chain per service. The original contribution is a service × layer × operating-organisation audit unit that separates web reachability, configured mail, and certificate issuance; applies the same sole-observed-provider rule to state and commercial operators; and reports modelling and scope sensitivities. Cloudflare was the sole observed provider at one or more web-reachability layers for 53 services (27.6%). Romania’s Special Telecommunications Service ranked second for web reachability and was concentrated in public administration. Sixty of the 62 services with an identifiable edge used a US-operated provider, and Cloudflare and Microsoft exposure sets each spanned all ten sector groups. The dnsc.ro worked example connects the snapshot to the provider’s 18 November 2025 outage without treating a measurement taken almost ten months later as an outage reconstruction. The results show that jurisdictional sovereignty and independently operated redundancy are distinct, measurable properties.